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Abstract. In this article, we propose a novel approach for identifying and evaluation of 
different solutions to discussed issues in online settings, based on the structure of a 
discussion of the topic in question. Our approach consists of three steps: (1) assigning 
weights to participants based on formal criteria such as degree of engagement in the 
discussion; (2) assigning scores to comments, taking the weights of authors and raters 
into account; (3) assigning scores to proposals, based on the scores of the pro and contra 
arguments. So an important idea is that individuals whose behavior is in line with our 
formal criteria have a higher influence on the decisions. Having built a respective online 
platform, we have evaluated the proposed model by means of an experiment with more 
than 100 participants who have discussed several topics relevant to them and a 
subsequent survey. In the survey, the majority of participants has expressed satisfaction 
with our forum model, including our weighting scheme. In particular, they have been fond 
of it regarding respect of the opinions of others.  
Introduction 
The question how communities can come to decisions and solutions that are 
satisfying for most of their members continues to be fundamentally important. 
There currently are various experiments and online projects trying to foster 
deliberation, i.e., the thoughtful consideration of all sides of an issue. This 
includes discussions and voting on budget planning for the German cities of Essen 
or Stuttgart (essen-kriegt-die-kurve.de, buergerhaushalt-stuttgart.de), to give some 
examples. The limitations of these two projects, however, are exemplary of the 
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ones of many other initiatives. For instance, essen-kriegt-die-kurve lets 
individuals propose concrete budget cuts and discuss these proposals. This project 
also tries to come to some conclusions from the discussion, by using rather simple 
quantitative measures such as the number of pro arguments regarding a proposal. 
However, this does not say much about the importance and relevance of the 
various arguments. In particular, people have started discussing issues not related 
to the proposal and have repeated arguments; this has affected those measures 
nevertheless. With Bürgerhaushalt Stuttgart in turn, individuals can come up with 
proposals others can then vote on. Our perspective is that, in such contexts, vested 
interests and priorities of individuals affect the outcome much more than 
argument quality. Our starting point is the hypothesis that making the community 
deliberate on the issues in question should increase its satisfaction with 
subsequent decisions – if the scheme that identifies and selects solutions to the 
issues discussed takes this deliberation into account. In a nutshell, the question 
investigated here is how online deliberation can be organized so that satisfying 
decisions can be derived from it. 
Challenges 
Our objective is the design of a platform that allows deriving satisfying decisions 
from the discussion; this is not obvious. In real life and in other studies, e.g., 
ConsiderIt (Kriplean et al., 2012), one usually takes pro and contra arguments into 
account when making a decision. We do the same, for each proposal: Proposals 
are discussed in different threads where people can provide pro and contra argu-
ments for each one, and an automated scheme selects a winner proposal in the 
end. In other words, decision-making is mainly based on the structure of the 
arguments, as opposed to voting. Thus, a first challenge is to decide which 
information to collect from individuals. At first sight, information that is useful 
includes whether an individual agrees or disagrees with a comment, or feedback 
on which comments he deems off-topic, repetitions etc. However, we need to 
flesh out which information is indeed collected. A subsequent challenge then is 
how we use this information to come to a decision. The decision-making scheme 
must be understandable and non-ambiguous, to enable participants to provide 
reliable meta-information and feedback. Finally, evaluating any approach that 
claims to foster deliberation is challenging as well. 
Design decisions 
To shed more light on our approach, we now list out our main design decisions, at 
different levels of abstraction. 
The look-and-feel of our deliberation forum is the one of a 
conventional forum wherever possible. Design and interaction features of our 
forum mainly are the ones of a classical forum. An alternative would have been an 
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entirely new design. However, user acceptance is crucial in our context, and our 
choice is likely to be better in this respect. Further, we can leverage existing 
technology and, hence, the host of comfort features provided by current 
implementations. 
Comments are typed, and the typing mimics common argumentation 
structures. We have introduced comment types such as pro and contra 
arguments. In our forum, each proposal corresponds to a separate thread 
containing the respective arguments, so that their discussions are separated from 
each other.  
The forum model should be simple and intuitive. We value simplicity 
of the model more than exactness and comprehensiveness. Literature has 
proposed various argumentation schemes with a high degree of sophistication, 
e.g., (Walton, Reed 2002; Parelman, Tyteca 1969; Toulmin 1958; Verheij 2006; 
Walton, Godden 2005; Restall et al. 2005). However, instead of having a model 
that is comprehensive but overly complicated for non-experts, and familiarization 
with it requires a lot of effort, we have limited our model to elementary comment 
and rating types.  
Community members have different weights, according to formal cri-
teria. In order to incentivize community members to follow our guidelines when 
deliberating, we have decided to assign them weights, and a higher weight gives 
an individual more influence on the decisions which will be taken. Next, a weight 
solely depends on formal criteria such as number of arguments provided, or share 
of arguments not flagged as repetitions by the community, subsequently referred 
to indicators. Note that individuals with low weights can still influence the out-
come by coming up with proposals or arguments that a weight-based majority is 
in favor of. While each argument meets a certain degree of agreement in the com-
munity, the weight of an individual does not depend on this degree of agreement 
of his arguments. The rationale is to not discriminate against minority opinions. 
The weight of a participant is the minimum of all his indicator values. 
An indicator value reveals the extent of a participant obeying the respective 
formal criterion. We deem it important that participants observe all of our criteria, 
and we want to incentivize such behavior. To illustrate, we do not want to give a 
high weight to someone who has issued many arguments if the community labels 
many of them as off-topic. Hence, the weight is the minimum of all indicator 
values. 
Individuals can give feedback on contributions by others, feedback is 
typed, and it is used according to its type. Participants may issue feedback on 
contributions by others, which is then used in different ways. For instance, partici-
pants can state that they agree or disagree with an argument issued by someone 
else or can mark it as off-topic or as a repetition of a previous argument. Given 
this feedback, an idea might be to combine the various feedback items of different 
type into one argument score. However, we have found this too undifferentiated. 
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For instance, agreement/disagreement ratings are used to quantify the acceptance 
by the community, while off-topic/repetition feedback is used to reject comments. 
Weights of individuals are published in the community. The alternative 
would be to not show this information so that participants are not influenced by it. 
Our decision has been to display current indicator values to give the participants 
an idea how their behavior so far has affected their weights. The rationale has 
been that this might stimulate the behavior desired. 
 We evaluate our approach experimentally. An alternative to experiments 
would have been a formal analysis or simulations. A difficulty with these alleged 
alternatives – at this stage of the project – is that they require various assumptions, 
e.g., how the number of arguments generated by different individuals is 
distributed, what is the ratio of off-topic arguments etc. 
Contributions 
Our contributions are as follows: First, we motivate and propose various criteria 
that constitute desirable behavior of community members, e.g., originality of 
arguments, focus on the topic in question etc., and propose formalizations of each 
of them. To stimulate desirable behavior, each community member has a weight 
that depends on the degree of adherence to our criteria. The weight determines his 
influence on the decision to be taken. Next, we propose a decision-making 
scheme that is argument-based. With our scheme, each argument is assigned a 
score that depends on the degree of agreement it has obtained from the 
community and on the weights of the respective individuals. We also formalize 
when an argument is rejected, i.e., ignored by the decision-making scheme. Our 
scheme assigns each proposal a score that depends on the share of pro and contra 
arguments and their scores. In our setup, proposals are alternatives to each other, 
and the proposal with the highest score will be the winner proposal. Finally, we 
evaluate our approach in a setting that is very close to a real one, with more than 
100 participants. Students of the database course at our university have 
deliberated on various topics relevant to them. An important result is that the 
majority has expressed satisfaction with the weighting criteria and decision-
making scheme, and they have given preference to our forum model over plain 
voting in terms of quality of decisions taken, mutual respect of opinion etc. 
Related Work 
Deliberation is a form of discussion where participants share their considerations 
in order to make decisions of higher quality and legitimacy (Chambers, 1996; 
Cohen, 1989; Carpini, Cook, Jacobs, 2004; Fearson, 1998; Fishkin, 1991, 1995; 
Gastil, 2000; Gutmann, Thompson, 1996). There are several problems with 
deliberation such as the diversity of the views of participants (Mutz, Marting, 
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2001), their lack of willingness of respecting deliberative rules (Conover, Searing, 
and Crewe 2002) or the nature of content allowed in deliberation. Various projects 
have studied how to nudge discussants towards more balanced considerations. 
This includes reflexive examination of own reasoning as well as of others. 
Effective moderation is considered crucial (Edwards, 2008). Otherwise, the 
perceived anonymity in forums can lead to ‘flame wars’, polarized debates and 
dominant minorities. With our approach, the working hypothesis is that our 
formal criteria are effective in keeping such behavior off. 
Related work has identified patterns in deliberative discussions and 
motives for participation, one of which is true interest in the issues to be 
deliberated (Habermas; Carpini et al., 2004; Freelon, 2010).  In the experiment in 
(Iyengar, Luskin, 2004), deliberation has yielded a significant increase in the 
informedness and engagement of participants. The Agora project (Muhlberger, 
2004) has addressed the conflict between intensified grouping, opinion 
polarization, and normative conformity of the group (Kiesler et al., 1984; Kiesler, 
Sproull, 1992). The E-Deliberate project has tried to impose a certain structure on 
the decision-making process, but this has been hard to obtain online (Schuler 
2009). Thus, the types of the postings we will provide allows to mimic the nature 
of the deliberative discussion, as described in those articles. 
Another group of projects has explored the potential of deliberation using 
argumentation schemes, e.g., Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS) (Isenmann 
et al., 1997). The tool resulting from the Cohere project tries to establish a system 
of social networking and reputation in the community through idea linking 
(Shum, 2008). Bart Verheij has proposed various argument-assistance systems 
such as ’ArguMed‘, ’Argue!’ etc. Still users experience difficulties when 
formalization is required. In our approach, we have targeted at an argumentation 
model that is intuitive, rather than exhaustive. 
Some recent projects have focused on expanding perspectives on the 
issues in question. The NewsCube project has tried to broaden views on news by 
giving several viewpoints (Park et al., 2009). Reflect is a system that engages and 
motivates discussants to restate, identify and share common grounds (Kriplean, 
Morgan, 2011). Opinion Space is an online interface incorporating ideas of 
deliberative polling, collaborative filtering for visualization and navigation 
through diverse comments (Faribani, Bitton et al., 2010). In our forum model we 
have tried to mitigate forming groups by enforcing anonymity, and by not 
explicitly displaying the types of the postings.  
Deliberation forum model 
We now describe our forum model in detail. We will elaborate on the interface, 
the discussion structure, the argumentation model, and the implementation. 
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Discussion structure and comments types 
The following is a comprehensive description of the discussion structure and its 
representation in our model. The discussion structure has the following elements: 
Forum (issue). A forum corresponds to the subject of discussion, e.g., ’How 
should EUR 500 be spent?’. 
Thread. Each thread within its forum discusses one specific suggestion on how 
the issue in question could be solved. 
Comments. Comments are the constituents of a thread, i.e., a comment is always 
part of a specific thread. Comments are typed, e.g., pro argument or contra 
argument. A comment can refer to another comment. 
Ratings. A rating expresses the perspective of an individual on a comment posted 
by someone else. In our context, a rating is a complex structure consisting of 
various attributes, e.g., whether the individual agrees or disagrees with the 
comment, how he evaluates the writing style or the tone of the comment etc. 
  There are different comment types:  
A proposal is a suggestion how to solve a forum issue. To illustrate, one issue in 
our study has been which criterion should be used to give away an iPad. One 
proposal has been to give it to the student with the highest number of points in the 
exercise in the current semester.  
Extension of a proposal. Individuals can extend a proposal by means of a 
comment (in contrast to issuing a new proposal). To illustrate, an extension of the 
proposal just mentioned has been to use the number of points in the exercise to 
assign a certain number of lots to individuals, and more points increase the 
number of lots and the probability of winning the iPad.  
A pro argument is a comment in favor of a proposal. 
A contra argument is a comment against a proposal.  
Other is a comment which the author does not want to classify as one of the types 
just mentioned. 
Rating model 
Participants can express their opinion on comments by others by means of a 
rating. In our context, a rating consists of the following attributes: 
Content. Individuals can assess a comment by content using one of the following 
options: agreement, disagreement, repetition, and off-topic. 
Writing style. Writing style can be evaluated using the grading scale from 1 to 5. 
Rate (5) represents clear, concise, argumentative writing style as opposed to 
unclear, confusing, incomplete text (1). 
Tone. Analogously, tone can be (5) balanced and polite, as opposed to 
provocative and offensive (1). 
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Comment type. To ensure that comment types as specified by the authors are 
correct other users can state the type of a comment as part of a rating as well. The 
possible values are proposal extension, pro argument, contra argument, and other. 
Weighting scheme 
Participants have a weight that is based on the formal criteria which describe the 
desired behavior of individuals. As mentioned, the weight of participants depends 
on indicators being quantifications of these criteria and determines their influence 
on the decisions taken eventually. We provide an overview of the criteria before 
giving the respective formal definitions: 
Originality. This indicator has a high value if few comments issued by the 
participant in question are rated as repetitions by many others. 
Focus. The fewer comments by the participant are rated as off-topic, the higher 
will be the value of the indicator. 
Style. The value of this indicator directly depends on the writing-style ratings of 
her/his comments. 
Tone. The value of the tone indicator directly depends on the tone ratings of the 
comments by the participants. 
Engagement. This indicator comprises the number of comments and ratings 
issued by the participant. 
Individuality. The rationale behind this criterion is to make collusion attacks and 
team-ups of individuals more difficult and to curb the influence of herding 
behavior. Individuality is the share of participants whom the participant in 
question agrees with in some context and disagrees with in some other context. To 
illustrate, a participant being a perfect match with many other participants 
regarding comments and ratings has a low value regarding this criterion. 
Breadth. We postulate that participants engaged in many discussion threads 
should be rewarded. The rationale is to curb the influence of participants with 
vested interests who only put attention to their specific issue.  
Honesty. The rationale here is to ensure honest behavior of participants. In recent 
years, economic literature has proposed a number of methods to maximize the 
reward for individuals answering questions truthfully, even in the absence of an 
objective truth criterion, so-called honest feedback mechanisms (HFM). For 
instance, the so-called peer-prediction method applies scoring rules to the 
posterior belief on ratings by others, and honest reporting turns out to be a Nash 
Equilibrium (Miller et al., 2005). The Bayesian truth serum in turn does not 
assume a probabilistic relationship between different responses. It uses ‘the 
surprisingly common’ criterion as truth criterion. According to Prelec (2004) the 
premise behind this is as follows: If people have a certain belief they tend to 
believe that this belief is more common than it actually is. We for our part use the 
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peer-prediction method; it assigns scores for each rating based on its probability 
compared to the reference rating (Jurca et al., 2006). 
While this is the list of criteria we have come up with after lengthy 
considerations, we do not claim at this point to have indeed covered all aspects of 
desirable behavior. However, we are confident not to face major difficulties when 
coming up with further criteria, redefining ours or even omitting some. 
Formulae and notation 
P is the set of all participants. ( )jK create  is the set of all comments Participant j 
has posted. K is the set of all comments posted in all forums. T is the set of all 
threads, and K(t) is the set of comments in Thread t. ( )tjK create ,  contains the 
comments posted by Participant j in t. F ⊂ T represents a forum.  ( ) ( )U
Ft
tKFK
∈
=  
is the set of all comments in Forum F. ( )jR create is the set of ratings which 
Participant j has posted. A rating consists of the following information: content 
rating, writing style and tone rating, type of the comment and the rater. The type 
of ‘content’ is the enumeration that takes values from {agree, disagree, off-topic, 
repetition}. Writing style and writing tone can take values from 1 to 5.  The type 
of ‘comment type’ is the enumeration with the following values: extension of a 
proposal, pro argumentation, contra argumentation and other. In our system, a 
rating does not have to be complete, i.e., participants can leave open individual 
values. Each rater can submit only one rating of a comment. R is a set of all 
ratings, irrespective of who has issued them. ( )kR is the set of ratings on 
Comment k, ( )jR subject  is the set of ratings on comments issued by Participant j, 
while ( )jR subjecttopicoff − is the set of ’off-topic‘ ratings of comments of Participant j. 
Definition. ( )jT create  is the set of all threads Participant j has actively 
participated in by posting a relatively high number of comments.  
( ) ( ) ( )( )






>∈=
∈
2/,,|: tiKavgtjKTtjT create
Pi
createcreate
 
Here, we only count threads where the participant has at least posted half 
of the average number of comments. The rationale has been to have a certain level 
of engagement as a prerequisite for active participation. The threshold value itself 
is ad-hoc.  
Definition: Breadth of Participant j. 
( ) ( )
T
jT
jbreadth
create
=:
 
Definition: Focus of Participant j.  
( ) ( )( )jR
jR
jfocus
subject
subject
topicoff −
−=1:
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Definition: Originality of Participant j.  
( ) ( )( )jR
jR
jorig
subject
subject
repetition
−=1:
 
Definition: A comment is useful when less than 50% of its ratings are ‘off-topic’ 
and ‘repetition’. The set of useful comments posted by Participant j is ( )jK createuseful , 
while the set of all these comments unrelated to a specific author is usefulK .  
Definition: Engagement of Participant j.  
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )iRavg
jR
iKavg
jK
jengage
create
Pi
create
engagecreate
useful
Pi
create
useful
∈∈
⋅+= α:
 
The weight engageα  is used to give different weights to comments and 
ratings. Since writing a comment requires more time and effort than submitting a 
rating, we have set ponder to 0.25 haphazardly. An alleged alternative has been to 
use 
 
R
Kuseful
engage =α . However, this value is not known a priori. 
Definition: A tone rating is bad when a tone attribute has a value of 1 or 2. 
( )jR createtone−  is the set of bad tone ratings of the comments that Participant j has 
posted. 
Definition: Tone of Participant j.  
( ) ( )( )jR
jR
jtone
subject
subject
tone−
−=1:  
Definition: A writing style rating is bad if it has a value of 1 or 2. ( )jR createstyle−  is 
the set of bad style ratings of the comments Participant j has posted. 
Definition: Writing style of Participant j. 
( ) ( )( )jR
jR
jstyle
subject
subject
style−
−=1:  
Definition: HFM score of Participant j. For each rating Participant j has posted, 
he receives a score based on the probability distribution of the given rating and the 
scoring function used by the peer prediction method (Miller, Resnick, Zeckhauser, 
2005). In our implementation, the scoring function is the linear programming 
function proposed by Jurca (2006). It maximizes the payoff when a participant is 
honest. The indicator value hfm(j) is the average of all HFM scores Participant j 
has received for his ratings according to the method. 
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Definition:  Similar ratings. Two ratings are similar when they refer to the same 
comment, and both either have value ’agreement‘ or ’disagreement’.  
Definition: Set of pairs of similar ratings posted by Participants i and j. Rsimil(i, j) 
is the maximal set of tuples of similar ratings (r1, r2) where Participant i has 
posted r1 and Participant j has posted r2.  
Definition: Similar comments. Two comments are similar when they are in the 
same proposal thread, and both either are of type ’pro argument‘ or ’contra 
argument’.  
Definition: Set of similar pro comments for participants i and j in the thread t. 
pro
similK  (i, j, t) := max(number of pro-argument comments posted by Participant i 
in Thread t, number of pro-argument comments posted by Participant j in a thread 
t). 
We define the number of pairs of contra argument for Participant i and 
Participant j in Thread t analogously. The number of pairs of similar comments 
for Participants i and j is the sum of prosimilK  (i, j, t) and contrasimilK (i, j, t).  ( )jiK simil ,   
is the sum of ( )jiK simil ,  over all threads. We define the number of tuples of 
different ratings and comments (Rdissimil, Kdisimil) analogously. 
Definition: Consensus of participants i and j. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jiKjiKjiRjiR
jiKjiRjicons
dissimilsimildissimilsimil
similsimil
,,,,
,,
:,
+++
+
=
 
Definition: Non-consensus of Participants i and j. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jiKjiKjiRjiR
jiKjiRjinoncons
dissimilsimildissimilsimil
dissimildissimil
,,,,
,,
:,
+++
+
=
 
Definition: Participants partly different from Participant j. 
( ) ( ){ }3.0,3.0,|:)( >∧>∈= jinonconsjiconsPijP partlyDiff
 
A participant has a high individuality if there are many participants he has 
consensus and non-consensus with at the same time. Again, we have set the 
threshold value to 30% somewhat haphazardly. 
Definition: Individuality of Participant j. 
( )
P
jP
jindiv
partlyDiff )(
:=  
All indicator values are in the range [0, 1]. We have seen two alternatives 
to normalize these values. Here, normalization does not only take the values, but 
also their distribution in the community into account. The normalized value of an 
indicator is the share of participants who have an indicator value lower than the 
one of the current participant. To illustrate, if only 20% of the community have 
performed better than Participant j regarding criterion breadth, j’s normalized 
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value of indicator breadth is 0.8. The advantage of this kind of normalization is 
that it distributes the participants over the entire [0, 1] range and makes criteria 
comparable. The disadvantage is when the majority performs similarly. Then 
slight deviations can have a significant effect. This is why we have not normalized 
indicators focus, originality, and style in this way. We have assumed that only a 
few participants would post off-topic or repetition comments, and if someone has 
a value slightly worse than average, this kind of normalization would have really 
set him back. The remaining indicators however are normalized in this way. 
Definition: Normalization of an indicator by frequency distribution. The 
normalized value of an indicator of Participant j is the share of participants whose 
indicator value is less than or equal to the value of j. We use the 
notation normindicator , e.g., ( )jindivnorm , for normalized indicator values. 
Definition: Weight of a participant.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 







=
jhfmscorejindivjengage
jbreadthjtonejstylejorigjfocusjWEIGHT
normnormnorm
norm
,,
,,,,,
min:  
A participant must perform well regarding all criteria in order to have a 
high weight. One reason why we use the minimum function here is that this 
becomes clear to the user as well. It should now be obvious to him which aspects 
of his behavior he needs to devote more attention to in order to receive a higher 
weight. 
Decision-making scheme 
Our decision-making scheme is argument-based. Each argument receives a score 
dependent on the degree of agreement it has obtained from the community and the 
weights of the respective individuals. Next, our scheme assigns each proposal a 
score that depends on the pro and contra arguments and their scores. In our setup, 
proposals are alternatives to each other, and the one with the highest score will be 
the winner proposal. 
Formulae and notation 
)( pKref  is the set of comments in the thread belonging to Proposal p. )( pKref+  is 
the set of pro arguments related to p, )( pKref− the set of contra arguments. The 
author of Comment k is denoted by author(k). )(kRref  is the set of all ratings of 
Comment k. )(kRref+ is the set of ratings of type ’agreement‘  while )(kRref−  is the 
set of ’disagreement’ ratings for Comment k.  
Definition: Comment score. 
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( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )kwrissuerweightkauthorweight
rissuerweightkauthorweight
kscore
krefRkrefRr
krefRr
1
)()(
5,0:)( ⋅












−
+
+
=
∑
∑




 −∪+∈
+∈
 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )










+
+
=
∑
∑




 −∪+∈
∈





 −∪+∈
)()(
'
1
'max
:
krefRkrefRr
FKk
krefRkrefRr
rissuerweightkauthorweight
rissuerweightkauthorweight
kw  
The score of a comment depends on the weight of its author and raters, and on the 
share of agreement ratings in the set of all ratings it has received. In addition, 
Weight w1 takes into account the number of participants having issued ratings of 
Comment k and normalizes the scores in the forum thread, using the maximum 
sum of weights of author and raters.  
Definition: Proposal score, pscore.  
{ }
{ } 








−
−
=
∑∑
∑∑
−∈



 ∪+∈
∈
−∈



 ∪+∈
||max
)(
)'(')'('
)()(
prefKk
k
pp
refKk
kFp
prefKk
k
pp
refKk
k
scorescore
scorescore
ppscore
 
The score of a proposal depends on the scores of its pro and contra arguments. 
The more pro arguments there are, and the higher their scores are, the higher is the 
proposal score. Similarly, the fewer contra arguments there are, and the lower 
their scores are, the higher is the proposal score. Additionally, scores are 
normalized on the forum level, to make scores in different forums comparable. 
 The evaluation of proposal extensions is a difficult issue considering that 
the context of these extensions is not bounded in any way. In particular, 
extensions can address different perspectives of the proposal; they can mutually 
exclude each other or not. We have left the question how to score them as future 
work and have evaluated them by hand in this current study. 
Anonymity 
Our forum is anonymous. The names of comments’ authors or raters are not 
visible. The rationale has been to indeed put the focus on the comments and the 
argumentation and not on the persons involved. Further, the type of a comment as 
specified by its author is not displayed. For instance, if a person is strongly in 
favor of a certain proposal, he might rate the contra arguments negative a priori 
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without even bothering to read. Similarly, summaries of ratings of comments 
issued so far are not shown either to avoid influencing participants.   
Hypotheses 
We have evaluated our forum model by means of an extensive user study. Before 
describing it, we list some of our hypotheses, together with their rationale.  
H1: Participants have deemed our weighting scheme fair. We are interested in 
the perception of the fairness of the model by participants, including our choice of 
criteria and the technical details of the indicator calculation.  
H2: The perception of usefulness of decision-making scheme is positively 
correlated with the perceived fairness of the weighting model. The fairer the 
weights are perceived, the better is the evaluation of the decision-making scheme. 
H3: The perceived fairness of the weighting scheme is positively correlated 
with the degree of respect for the opinions of others. This hypothesis evaluates 
the effects of the weighting scheme on the evaluation of proposed solutions to the 
discussed issues. By assigning weights to the participants, they have different 
degrees of influence on the decisions. 
H4: The higher the perceived usefulness of decision-making scheme, the 
more satisfied is the community with the winner proposals.  If participants 
perceive the decision-making scheme as useful, it should have a positive effect on 
their attitude towards winner proposals. 
H5: The higher the evaluation of the decision-making scheme, the higher is 
the perceived quality of the decisions. This claim is similar to Hypothesis H4, 
but with the distinction that the perceived quality of the decisions is affected. 
H6: The perceived quality of the decisions is positively correlated with the 
participants’ feeling that their opinion is respected. If participants think that 
their opinion is respected in the community, this should affect their evaluation of 
the quality of decisions in a positive way. 
H7: The degree of adherence to our criteria is positively correlated with the 
fairness perceived. The rationale behind this hypothesis is to gather further 
evidence whether our design works at all.  
H8: Displaying weights of participants affects their behavior. In other words, 
the indicator values displayed to all participants will influence their behavior in a 
way that is desirable. 
Experimental setup 
Our implementation of the forum model proposed so far is based on the open-
source forum software phpBB. It is written in php and uses the MySQL database 
for persistent data storage. phpBB is listed in relevant blogs and forums as one of 
the top ten open-source forum projects. We have extended the existing phpBB 
platform with the specifics of our model: comment types, ratings and weighting 
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and decision-making scheme. Additionally, we have adapted the interface in order 
to anonymize the data, i.e., we did not want to display information such as the 
names of comment authors. 
To evaluate the proposed model, we have run an experiment with 250 
participants. The participants were students in the database course in the fourth 
semester of the KIT Bachelor program in computer science. The experiment was 
running for four weeks. In this time period, students have discussed several issues 
relevant to them. To illustrate, the list of topics is following: 
What should be the topic of the last session of this database course? We have 
come up with the following three proposals ourselves, in line with the knowledge 
and interests of the instructor, and have made them available for discussion: data 
management in the cloud, introduction to database security, introduction to the 
development of database applications.  
How should a budget of EUR 500 be spent on behalf of the students? Only 
proposals which are in line with the German regulations on how public money 
may be spent are admitted by the moderator. ‘Beer’ is an example of a proposal 
that is not acceptable. 
We have procured a new iPad (3rd generation, Wi-Fi, 16 GB) to give away; who 
should receive it. Proposals containing the names of individuals or 
circumscriptions of concrete individuals are not accepted, only abstract 
specifications such as ‘the best student in the class’. 
Assuming that the computer-science department is able to fund a new chair, what 
should be its research direction? The winner proposal (and only the winner 
proposal, in order to avoid information overload) will be brought to the attention 
of the dean of the department. 
What should be the topic of a new course in the area of databases/information 
systems in the next academic year? We have promised that the winner proposal 
will indeed materialize. 
Given the current criteria for the selection of students for the KIT master program 
in computer science, which one should get a higher weight? The winner proposal 
will be brought to the attention of the dean.  
Regarding the current KIT bachelor program in computer science, what is the 
most urgent reform? The winner proposal will be brought to the attention of the 
dean. 
We point out that we have announced that the decisions by the group are 
binding to us. For instance, we have promised that we will indeed offer the course 
with the highest degree of agreement in the subsequent academic year, and that 
we will try hard to find a lecturer in case we are not able to teach it ourselves 
(analogously with the iPad or the EUR 500). Regarding the issues where the 
winner proposal is brought to the attention of the dean, we also deem this a real 
incentive, since it should be of interest to the management of the department to 
get to know the preferences of an entire age group. 
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To illustrate the effects of moderation, we have discarded the suggestion 
that EUR 500 should be used to buy cake to throw at each other. However, once a 
proposal had been approved, we have not filtered any arguments referring to it. 
For all issues, we have made it clear that there will only be one winner proposal, 
e.g., the EUR 500 will not be split. The rationale has been that we indeed wanted 
to study how the community deals with the situation where proposals compete 
with each other. 
In our specific setup, a further incentive for taking part in the forum 
discussions were bonus points for the final exam, as follows: A participant must 
have posted 5 comments, none of them off-topic or repetition, and 20 ratings in 
order to receive a bonus of 5% of the points one could earn in the exam. With 
fewer comments and ratings, the bonus has been proportionally smaller. 
Obviously, an urgent question now is whether this bonus is the only rationale for 
participation. However, statements in the questionnaire and participation statistics 
indicate that a significant number of participants have been interested in the forum 
discussions themselves. Out of 163 participants who have posted at least one 
comment, 74 have posted more than five comments; out of 156 participants who 
have submitted at least one rating, 103 participants have generated more than 
20 ratings. Thus, while that bonus might have influenced participant behavior, it 
obviously is not the only stimulus for participation. 
 We have decided to evaluate our forum model by means of a questionnaire. 
At an early stage of the project, we had considered forming a committee of 
experts who would assess the various proposals. However, it is difficult to impos-
sible to decide which proposal actually is good, and which one is not. To illus-
trate, even ‘beer’ might actually be a good proposal, since it fosters socializing 
within that community – even though the organizers of this experiment might not 
like it. Further, our research question has been how to arrive at decisions satisfy-
ing to most of the community members and not necessarily at good decisions. We 
point out that privacy is valued highly in Germany, and we have done the 
evaluation anonymously (and actually had to go through significant effort to 
facilitate that bonus-point regulation). In consequence, we could not relate 
questionnaire answers to user behavior in our system. We do plan to analyze the 
user data collected from our system in detail, but such a study exceeds the scope 
of this article. 
Results 
In total, 250 participants have registered. 163 of them have generated at least one 
comment, and 156 have issued at least one rating. 116 participants have filled out 
the questionnaire. As described earlier, there have been seven different forum 
issues, and participants could generate proposals for six of them. The moderator 
had approved 88 proposals altogether, and 963 comments were generated in total.  
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We now say which hypotheses we have been able to validate in our setting. 
H1: Participants have deemed our weighting scheme fair. Looking at the 
absolute numbers, 19 participants out of the total number of 116 participants have 
rated the fairness of the model as moderate. Recall that the grading scale ranges 
from 1 (not fair at all) up to 5 (very fair). Here, ‘moderate’ means Rates 1 or 2. 
Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed. – The criteria with the highest correlation with 
the perceived fairness are the following ones: focus (7 moderate out of 116), tone 
(16 moderate out of 116), and honesty (15 out of 116). The highest positive 
correlation between the perception of the fairness of the weighting scheme and the 
fairness of the criteria is observed for the following criteria: tone (r = 
0.356591298, p < 0.001), individuality (r = 0.349014637, p <0.001), originality (r 
= 0.335690504, p < 0.001). 
  
H2: The perception of usefulness of decision-making scheme is positively 
correlated with the perceived fairness of the weighting model. Our analysis of 
the questionnaire data shows that there is a significant correlation (r = 
0.543288363, p<0.001). In absolute numbers, only 11 participants out of 116 have 
rated the decision-making scheme as moderate, 32 were neutral. 
H3: The perceived fairness of the weighting scheme is positively correlated 
with the degree of respect for the opinions of others. We have not observed a 
significant correlation. One possible explanation is that participants have not 
seen/understood how their weights affect comment scores and the evaluation of 
suggested solutions.  
H4: The higher the perceived usefulness of decision-making scheme, the 
more satisfied is the community with the winner proposals. We have not 
observed a significant correlation that confirms the relationship from the 
hypothesis. . Leaving aside that we have not been able to confirm that correlation, 
the usefulness of the decision-making scheme is high: 11 participants out of 116 
have rated the decision-making scheme as moderate, 32 were neutral. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that people think that their opinion is respected. 
Out of 114 participants who have answered the question on the respect of opinion 
in the forum, 73 participants have given high rates, 24 were neutral and only 11 
participants have found it unsatisfactory.  
H5: The higher the evaluation of the decision-making scheme, the higher is 
the perceived quality of the decisions. Data analysis has shown a certain 
correlation (r = 0.201883911, p < 0.05). Still, the probability of misinterpreting 
the correlation is lower than 5% (p<0.05), but not smaller, and this leaves some 
uncertainty from a statistics point of view. 
H6: The perceived quality of the decisions is positively correlated with the 
participants’ feeling that their opinion is respected. The correlation is 
significant r = 0.23265865, p < 0.02.  The quality of the final decision is closely 
related to the perceived respect of the opinion of others in the forum. 
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H7: The degree of adherence to our criteria is positively correlated with the 
fairness perceived. We have not discovered any significant correlation. Note that 
this does not mean that the relationship that forms the basis of the hypothesis does 
not exist; it is just that we have not been able to validate it in our setup and with 
our questionnaire. In absolute numbers, 31 participants out of 116 have stated that 
the criteria and the weights have influenced their behavior in the forum. See 
Section 6.1 for a respective discussion. 
H8: Displaying weights of participants affects their behavior. Again, we 
cannot confirm this hypothesis here. Only 13 participants out of 116 have stated 
that their weights or the ones of their peers have affected them. We stress that we 
have communicated our criteria in detail; still, according to most participants, this 
has not influenced their behavior. Again, see Section 6.1 for a discussion. 
 A further point is that participants were honest when rating contributions of 
others. Out of 116 participants 110 claimed that they had behaved honestly. 
Additionally, in the control question more than 65% of participants have 
estimated that more than 70% of participants had behaved honestly. In our 
opinion, such a high percentage of participants deeming a rather large group of 
other participants honest in many situations is a positive result. The correlation 
between self-reported honesty and the perceived honesty of others is significant 
(r = 0.360109957, p < 0.001). 
Discussion 
Although the questionnaire results have been helpful to answer some of our 
questions, there are some results that leave room for different interpretations. 
Questionnaire results 
Looking at the free-text answers in the questionnaire, we for our part have gained 
the impression that the judgments on some points were sometimes based on 
superficial interpretations rather than on a thorough understanding of the issues. 
According to our web-access statistics, the majority of participants has not fully 
read the documentation of the weighting and the decision-making scheme. E.g., 
participants have evaluated criterion ’honesty‘ high, although most of them 
probably have not understood the peer-prediction method, and a few individuals 
have complained about their scores. Another example is that the decision-making 
scheme, though rated highly, has not yielded more acceptable decisions from the 
community point of view. The participants have acknowledged that respect of 
opinions of others is higher, and that decisions are of higher quality, but not 
higher tolerance towards decisions taken. Furthermore, participants rarely have 
given full-text answers containing constructive comments on how the model 
could be improved, or explaining why they have not been satisfied.   
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Democratic principle 
Clearly, weighting participants based on their behavior means that participants 
have different influence on the decisions. The advantage is that this should serve 
as an incentive to take part in the deliberation in a constructive fashion. However, 
when trying to convince another community to adopt our approach in order to 
come to decisions, there has been some resentment that our scheme was ‘not 
democratic’ because of that reason. However, our approach does not violate the 
principle of equality according to the German constitution since it treats all par-
ticipants equally; we have consulted with legal experts on this issue. Further, our 
perspective is that the criteria are clear and well-documented. In addition, one's 
opinion does not affect the weight since our criteria are purely formal and do not 
include the degree of agreement/disagreement of the community with the argu-
ments. Further, participants with a low weight can still influence the decisions, by 
coming up with arguments that are well received by most community members. 
Forum model 
The motivation behind our work has been to foster deliberation and to give way to 
decisions widely accepted by the community. We have conducted our evaluation 
with the audience of a university course. This has some differences to other 
communities: First, an age group of university students, being roughly of the same 
age and sharing similar academic interests, is a relatively homogeneous group of 
individuals, compared to other settings. For instance, think of public or political 
discussions which gather different groups of individuals regarding motivation, 
interests, educational and social background. Second, in our context, while bonus 
points have been an important incentive, they have certainly not been the only 
stimulus for participation. Students have shown interest for the topics discussed, 
i.e., two third of the students who have posted at least one rating have posted 
more ratings than required to receive the full bonus. Finally, our rules for earning 
the bonus points have affected the behavior of participants. They should have 
posted a certain number of comments and ratings in order to earn this reward. 
These settings have advantages and disadvantages. While it might seem at first 
sight that this lets our approach appear in a better light, this is not necessarily the 
case. In particular, individuals who have only been interested in the bonus, but not 
in the issues to be deliberated had to generate comments and ratings. One would 
expect this ‘noise’ to curb the satisfaction of the rest of the community with our 
approach. Nevertheless, the satisfaction rate has been high, as described earlier. 
This gives way to the expectation that our approach will also work in settings 
without any external incentives such as bonus points. However, investigating this 
is future work. 
Another issue is that the system is to some extent vulnerable to attacks 
such as the following ones: Individuals can team up, earn high weights by 
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deliberating issues of little interest to them, and then use their weights to influence 
decisions relevant to them. However, our criterion ’breadth’, while not ruling out 
this attack completely, does make it more difficult. Further, while it does not 
mean that this behavior pattern does not occur, participants in our study have not 
observed this kind of attack, at least according to the questionnaire. The question 
how to make this attack even more difficult is future work. Another problem is 
that we have observed that some comments did not have any relevance for the 
discussion; still they have not been marked as off-topic. By finding ways to reduce 
the number of or eliminate this kind of comment, the overall quality of the 
arguments would increase. One way to deal with this problem could be to 
introduce another category next to ‘repetition’ or ‘off-topic’, namely ‘irrelevant’ 
and to have a respective new criterion, i.e., participants must not post irrelevant 
comments. Another solution might be to leave aside arguments without any 
ratings or follow-up comments when computing proposal scores. This item is a 
specific example of a larger issue, namely that our model can still be improved. 
As mentioned, our model is ad-hoc, and improvements are likely to be possible. 
However, note that this is not in contradiction to our contributions. In a nutshell, 
our concern has been to check whether our specific model is useful. 
As stated before, the evaluation of proposal extensions is an open issue 
which is very difficult to solve, considering the diversity of extensions. For 
instance, we do not see at this point how to decide whether two proposal 
extensions mutually exclude each other or could both be implemented. Further, 
even if we could answer this question, we would have to decide how to select the 
extensions to be implemented. Addressing these questions exceeds the scope of 
this current study and is future work. As mentioned, we have evaluated the 
extensions by hand in our current study. The fact that nobody from the community 
has brought up any concerns regarding this could indicate that participants might 
already be happy with a moderator/elected representative choosing the extensions 
to be implemented, as long as the proposal with the highest score will be carried 
out. 
Conclusions 
In this article, we have proposed a novel approach for identifying and evaluation 
of problem solutions in online settings, based on the discussion itself and its 
structure. The decision-making process we have proposed relies on the 
deliberative manner of collecting and exchanging arguments in order to weight 
solution options. In order to achieve a discussion structure that gives way to an 
evaluation of solution options we have come up with various extensions of 
conventional forums and discussion structures. We have evaluated our approach 
by conducting an experiment with individuals discussing topics of relevance for 
this particular community. Our overall impression of the discussions is that the 
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individuals have addressed the issues very well.  The results we have presented 
here are from the survey conducted after the experiment. They suggested that that 
particular community had been satisfied with our forum model and the respective 
decisions.  
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